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ABSTRACT 
The paper presents a political economy model of official foreign exchange market 
intervention and tests the model against the recent experience of Japan. In several industrial 
countries, the government is responsible for intervention decisions while the central bank is 
given operational independence in its conduct of monetary policy. The paper models the 
interaction between the two agencies, empirically tests the central bank reaction function, 
and considers conditions under which intervention might change monetary policy. Daily 
Japanese intervention data give broad support to the prediction of the model with respect to 
central bank behavior. Although it is difficult to be definitive about the hidden motive of 
central bank actions, during the extraordinary period of 2001-04 when Japan remained 
under deflationary pressure, the central bank, faced with large political costs of sterilization, 
accommodated a considerable portion of the massive interventions made by the 
government. Under normal conditions coordination between the two agencies might be 
desirable, not least to make the signal of any intervention credible, but giving an alternative 
agency the authority over intervention decisions can be a means of enhancing democratic 
accountability for an independent central bank while preserving the credibility of monetary 
policy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper presents a political economy model of official foreign exchange market 
intervention, tests the model against the recent experience of Japan, and considers whether 
intervention systematically influenced monetary policy. In some countries (which include 
Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States),1 the official entity responsible for 
intervention decisions is different from the one responsible for monetary policy.2
While Japan is not alone in having two separate entities for intervention and 
monetary policy decisions, it provides an ideal setting for considering the political economy 
of foreign exchange market intervention in such a system, given the sheer scale of 
intervention (conducted by the Ministry of Finance) under quantitative easing (pursued by 
 But 
foreign exchange market intervention, which alters the balance of base money, necessitates 
a monetary policy decision, thus presenting a potential conflict between intervention and 
monetary policy. A question naturally arises as to why such a system exists in the first 
place, how it functions in practice, and whether it delivers an outcome different from that 
under an alternative system (where the central bank is made responsible for both 
intervention and monetary policy decisions). The paper is a modest, first attempt to explore 
these issues of institutional design with respect to foreign exchange and monetary policies. 
                                                 
1 In the United States legal ambiguity exists as to the respective roles of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve, 
but Treasury supremacy over exchange rate policy has developed through bargaining and decades of 
cooperation and has not been challenged (Destler and Henning 1989). FRB (2005) states: “The Federal 
Reserve conducts foreign currency operations [..,] acting in close and continuous consultation and cooperation 
with the U.S. Treasury, which has overall responsibility for U.S. international financial policy. 
2 These countries, however, appear to be in the minority. In a Bank for International Settlements paper, 
Moser-Boehm (2005) reports that, out of the 22 countries surveyed in December 2004 for the study (which 
exclude Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States), 19 countries had an arrangement in which central 
banks had the authority to make decisions for intervention; two out of the remaining three countries had a 
system in which central banks and governments shared the responsibility. In contrast, the government, not the 
central bank, determines the choice of exchange rate regime in the overwhelming majority of countries 
(Lybek and Morris 2004). 
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the Bank of Japan) during 2001-04. After a prolonged period of economic stagnation 
characterized by low economic growth and deflation, in March 2001, the Bank of Japan 
(BOJ) adopted what became known as the quantitative easing monetary policy (QEMP). It 
consisted of three pillars: (i) the BOJ supplied ample liquidity by using the deposits of 
commercial banks held at the central bank (current account balances, or CAB)—a 
component of the monetary base—as the main operating target; (ii) it publicly committed 
itself to maintaining ample liquidity until core consumer price index (CPI) inflation became 
zero or higher on a sustained basis; and (iii) it increased the purchases of Japanese 
government bonds (JGBs) to inject liquidity (see Maeda et al. 2005 for technical details). 
For the period of QEMP as a whole, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) intervened in 
the foreign exchange market over 130 times (using its own balance sheet, but acting 
through the Bank of Japan as its agent), with a cumulative sale of about 42 trillion yen 
(about $380 billion). While the MOF’s policy at the outset of the QEMP period was to 
intervene decisively but infrequently, the intervention tactic changed in January 2003 when 
intervention became both frequent and large-scale (Figure 1). During the 15-month period 
of the so-called “great intervention” (from January 2003 through March 2004),3
                                                 
3 In Japan, the great intervention has also been named as the Mizoguchi-Taylor intervention after Zenbei 
Mizoguchi and John B. Taylor who were at the time largely responsible for making or condoning the 
Japanese government’s intervention decisions as Japanese Vice Minister of Finance and US Treasury 
Undersecretary, respectively. Taylor explained that by “adopting a more tolerant position toward 
intervention—especially if it went unsterilized” the US position was to “help to increase the money supply in 
Japan” (Taylor 2007, p.286). The 22 March 2004 issue of Business Week magazine, calling Mizoguchi “Mr. 
Dollar,” described him as “a faceless bureaucrat in a town full of them [who] enjoys celebrity status” in 
trading pits in London and New York. 
 the 
authorities sold for US dollars a cumulative sum of 35 trillion yen, an amount equivalent to 
7 percent of Japan’s annual GDP. In 2003 and 2004, the purchases of foreign assets by the 
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public sector were so large that the private sector recorded a capital account surplus even 
though the country had a large surplus in the current account. The great intervention ended 
abruptly on 16 March 2004, though QEMP would last until March 2006.4
The fact that the BOJ was pursuing QEMP is of critical importance. The Bank of 
Japan Law guarantees the central bank’s operational independence from government 
oversight in its conduct of operations aimed at price and financial system stability. If the 
BOJ had been under the more normal operating procedure of most contemporary advanced 
country central banks, it would have had to sterilize any impact of intervention on the 
monetary base in order to maintain the short-term policy interest rate (the overnight call 
rate in the case of Japan) at a target level.
 
5 Then, an intervention decision would have been 
largely divorced from a monetary policy decision, as should be the case when an 
independent central bank desires to maintain the credibility of its monetary policy. Under 
these circumstances, the MOF can only hope to influence the level of foreign exchange 
reserves and the composition of base money. Intervention could still affect the exchange 
rate but only through the signaling and portfolio balance channels,6
                                                 
4 The Japanese authorities would not intervene in the foreign exchange market at all until 15 September 2010. 
The September 2010 intervention was a one-time event in which they sold 2.1 trillion yen for US dollars. 
 the substantive and 
lasting effectiveness of which is generally considered in the literature as limited at best 
(Edison 1993; Sarno and Taylor 2001). 
5 Even with interest rate targeting, however, sterilization would not have been necessary if interest had been 
paid on excess reserves, in which case the interest rate on excess reserves becomes the floor below which 
market interest rates cannot fall. The Bank of Japan only began to pay interest on excess reserves in 
November 2008. 
6 If the signaling effect works by influencing market expectations about the future stance of monetary policy, 
it may be absent in a system where the entity responsible for intervention cannot make a credible commitment 
to the future actions of an independent central bank. This issue is discussed further in a later section of this 
paper. 
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Under quantitative easing, on the other hand, there is potential room for 
collaboration between intervention and monetary policy decisions. It is conceivable in the 
case of Japan, for example, that the BOJ could use the MOF’s intervention (to purchase 
foreign assets) as an instrument of achieving a particular CAB target. During the period 
under consideration, moreover, the policy interest rate was virtually zero. This means that, 
given the zero lower bound, the BOJ was not constrained by the operational requirements 
to sterilize the impact of intervention on the monetary base with a view to maintaining the 
interest rate at a particular level. These considerations motivate our strategy of building a 
political economy model of intervention where separate entities are responsible for 
intervention and monetary policy decisions, and testing it against the experience of Japan 
during 2001-04. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I constructs a simple political 
economy model of the interaction between the Ministry of Finance (an entity responsible 
for intervention decisions) and the Bank of Japan (an entity responsible for monetary policy 
decisions while acting also as the government’s agent for intervention operations). Section 
II estimates the Bank of Japan reaction function derived from the theoretical model, in 
order to see how monetary policy decisions responded to intervention decisions within the 
monetary policy framework of 2001-04. Section III considers the broader political economy 
question of whether the Ministry of Finance altered the behavior of the central bank with 
respect to monetary policy decisions, through its massive interventions in the foreign 
exchange market. Finally, section IV presents concluding remarks. 
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I. A POLITICAL ECONOMY MODEL OF INTERVENTION 
Modeling the interaction between the MOF and the BOJ 
We construct a simple political economy model of the interaction between the 
MOF (responsible for intervention decisions) and the BOJ (responsible for monetary policy 
or sterilization decisions) to reflect the circumstances of the 2001-04 period of quantitative 
easing when intervention was all in the direction of purchasing US dollars in exchange for 
Japanese yen. Let x  denotes the amount of intervention, z ( ],0[ x∈ ) the amount of 
sterilization, m~  the initial (pre-intervention) level of the monetary base, and s~  the initial 
level of the exchange rate defined as units of yen per US dollar. Here, in view of the 
economic environment in Japan during the period of quantitative easing, a positive value of 
x  means a net sale of yen for US dollars (and we do not consider a negative value for x ).  
Suppose that the MOF intervenes in the foreign exchange market to sell yen for 
dollars and that the BOJ responds subsequently by sterilizing part or all of the intervention. 
Then, the monetary base m  becomes: 
 zxmm −+= ~ .        (1) 
By linear approximation, the expected value of the exchange rate ( es ) is assumed to be: 
 zxsse δα −+= ~ ,        (2) 
where 0>> δα . By postulating equation (2) we are not asserting that intervention 
influences the exchange rate in a particular way. It is possible that intervention, whether 
sterilized or unsterilized, does not in reality influence the level of the exchange rate. 
Equation (2) simply notes that the authorities when intervening in the foreign exchange 
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market believe that they are influencing the future exchange rate in a particular way. 
Otherwise, there would be no reason to intervene in the first place. 
 We assume that the objective functions (or loss functions) of the MOF and the BOJ 
are given, respectively, by the following equations: 
 )()()( 211
2
111 xmmssL
e Θ+−+−= ∗∗ µλ ,     (3) 
 )()()( 222
2
222 zmmssL
e Σ+−+−= ∗∗ µλ ,     (4) 
where 01 >λ , 01 ≥µ , 02 ≥λ , and 02 >µ ; 
∗
1s  and 
∗
1m are the MOF’s targets for the 
exchange rate and the monetary base, respectively; and ∗2s  and 
∗
2m are the BOJ’s 
counterparts. These functions can be considered as the “reduced forms” obtainable from 
minimizing the respective loss functions that explicitly contain inflation and GDP gap 
(Barro and Gordon 1983; Woodford 2010).7
1µ
 The assumed signs of the parameters imply 
that the MOF (BOJ) may not care about the base money (the exchange rate), given their 
assigned roles in Japan’s economic policymaking apparatus. In this case,  (for the MOF) 
and 2λ  (for the BOJ) would be zero. In fact, we later assume that the BOJ has no target for 
the level of the exchange rate ( 02 =λ ) in one of the empirical specifications.
8
Because we only consider yen-selling intervention in an environment of 
deflationary pressure, we assume that 
 
ss ~*1 >  and mm ~1 >
∗ . )(xΘ  in equation (3) represents 
                                                 
7 If we start out with explicit loss functions defined by inflation and GDP gap, we obtain the secondary loss 
functions (corresponding to equations (3) and (4)) as polynomials in s and m. It is only for the sake of 
simplification that we start with loss functions defined directly by s and m. 
8 On the other hand, a strong case can be made for believing that the Ministry of Finance had an implicit 
target for the monetary base (or money supply) in the early 2000s. In the fall of 2001, the government made it 
a central pillar of macroeconomic policy to fight deflation and subsequently included monetary policy (the 
exclusive domain of the central bank) in a package of measures to be implemented (Yoshikawa 2009).   
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the cost of intervention (which satisfies 0)0( =Θ , 0>Θ′ , and 0>Θ ′′ ), and )(zΣ  in 
equation (4) represents the cost of sterilization (which satisfies 0)0( =Σ , 0'>Σ , and 
0>Σ ′′ ). These costs not only reflect the transactions and administrative costs of relevant 
market operations but also may involve political and other considerations. For example, the 
MOF may receive foreign criticism for intervention if it is large and sustained; the BOJ 
may likewise receive criticism or harassment from the MOF or politicians for sterilization 
operations and face the risk of increasing market volatility as the scale of sterilization rises. 
Both of these costs are modeled as quadratic, such that: 221)( xxx θθ +=Θ  ( 01 >θ , 02 >θ ) 
and 221)( zzz σσ +=Σ  ( 01 >σ , 02 >σ ). 
 Finally, the MOF makes intervention decisions while taking into account the 
reaction of the BOJ in terms of any sterilization. As for the BOJ, it takes the amount of 
intervention x  as given and makes a sterilization decision so as to minimize the value of 
2L . The amount of sterilization z  can therefore be represented as the reaction function 
)(xz Ψ= . The MOF takes this reaction function into account when it determines the 
amount of intervention x  so as to minimize the value of 1L . 
The optimization problem for the BOJ 
 Following the method of backward solution, we first consider the optimization 
problem for the BOJ, given the amount of intervention x . Substituting equations (1) and 
(2) into equation (3), we obtain: 
2
21
2
22
2
222 )~()~( zzmzxmszxsL σσµδαλ ++−−++−−+=
∗∗  
Differentiating with respect to z , we have: 
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 ))((2 22
2
2
2 ωψσµδλ +−++=
∂
∂ xz
z
L , 
where )0(
22
2
2
22 >
++
+
≡
σµδλ
µαδλ
ψ  and 
22
2
2
12
1
2222 )~()~(
σµδλ
σµδλ
ω
++
+−+−
≡
∗∗ mmss
; we here 
assume 1<ψ  because 2σ  is positive in the specification for the cost of sterilization. 
Because the BOJ has two potential targets (the monetary base and the exchange 
rate), we must consider the following two cases, depending on the deviation of the actual 
monetary base from the target ( mm ~2 −
∗ ) in relation to the deviation of the actual exchange 
rate from the target ( ss −∗2 ): 
[A] 0>ω ⇔ 1212222 )
~()~( σδλµ −−−>− ∗∗ ssmm  (the initial deviation of the 
monetary base from the target is sufficiently large) 
[B] 0<ω ⇔ 1212222 )
~()~( σδλµ −−−<− ∗∗ ssmm  (the initial deviation of the 
monetary base from the target is sufficiently small) 
We consider these cases in turn below. 
First, in Case A ( 0>ω ), the optimal value of z  is given by: 



>
≤
−
=Ψ=
ψω
ψω
ωψ / if
/ if0
)(
x
x
x
xz      (5) 
If the amount of intervention x  is below the critical level ψω / , the BOJ does not sterilize 
the intervention at all. If the amount of intervention x  is above the critical level ψω / , on 
the other hand, the BOJ only partially sterilizes the intervention. The reaction function 
)(xz Ψ=  can be depicted as Figure 2, which essentially shows that the central bank wants 
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to use the intervention as a means of achieving the target for the monetary base when there 
is a large shortfall in the balance of base money. 
Second, in Case B ( 0<ω ), the optimal value of z  is given by: 



−−>
−−≤
−
=Ψ=
)1/( if
)1/( if
)(
ψω
ψω
ωψ x
x
x
x
xz     (6) 
If the amount of intervention x  is below the critical level )1/( ψω −− , the BOJ fully 
sterilizes the intervention. If the amount of intervention x  is above the critical level 
)1/( ψω −− , on the other hand, the BOJ only partially sterilizes the intervention. The 
reaction function )(xz Ψ=  in this case can be depicted as Figure 3. The kinked line 
essentially incorporates the behavior of the central bank that sterilizes the intervention fully 
or partially when the monetary base target is already reached or the shortfall in the balance 
of base money is small. 
The optimization problem for the MOF 
 
Having considered the optimization problem for the BOJ, we next consider the 
optimization problem for the MOF, given the BOJ’s reaction function )(xz Ψ= . Here 
again, we must separately consider two cases, A and B, corresponding to 0>ω  and 0<ω , 
respectively. First, in Case A ( 0>ω ), substituting equations (1), (2), and (5) into equation 
(4), we obtain: 
 



>
≤
=
ψω
ψω
/ if)(
/ if)(
1
1
1 xxL
xxL
L II
I
, 
where: 221
2
11
2
111 )~()~()( xxmxmsxsxL
I θθµαλ ++−++−+= ∗∗ , and 
2
21
2
11
2
111 })(~{})(~{)( xxmxxmsxxsxL
II θθωψµωψδαλ ++−−−++−−−+= ∗∗ . 
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Further differentiating with respect to x , we obtain: 
 }])~()~({)[(2)( 121111121
2
1
1 θµαλθµαλ −−+−−++= ∗∗ mmssx
dx
xdLI , 
x
dx
xdLII })1()([{2)( 2
2
1
2
1
1 θψµδψαλ +−+−=  
}])~)(1()~)(({ 1211111 θωψµωδψαλ −−−−+−−−−
∗∗ mmss . 
Because the MOF is assumed to have its own potential targets for the exchange rate 
and the monetary base, there are three separate cases to consider for the optimal value of x , 
depending on the relative sizes of the deviation of the actual exchange rate from the target 
( ss −∗1 ) and the deviation of the actual monetary base from the target ( mm ~1 −
∗ ).  
Case A1:  If 0
)~()~(
21
2
1
12
1
1111 <
++
−−+− ∗∗
θµαλ
θµαλ mmss
, the optimal value of x  is 0=x . 
Case A2: If ψω
θµαλ
θµαλ
/
)~()~(
0
21
2
1
12
1
1111 <
++
−−+−
<
∗∗ mmss
, the optimal value of x  is given 
by: 
))/,0((
)~()~(
21
2
1
12
1
1111 ψω
θµαλ
θµαλ
∈
++
−−+−
=
∗∗ mmss
x . 
Case A3: If ψω
θµαλ
θµαλ
/
)~()~(
21
2
1
12
1
1111 >
++
−−+− ∗∗ mmss
 





< 0)/(and 1
dx
dLII ψω
, the optimal 
value of x  is given by:9
                                                 
9 If 
 
ψω
θµαλ
θµαλ
/
)~()~(
21
2
1
12
1
1111 >
++
−−+− ∗∗ mmss
 and 0)/(1 >
dx
dLII ψω
, the optimal value of x  is 
ψω /=x . 
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 )/(
)1()(
)~)(1()~)((
2
2
1
2
1
12
1
1111 ψω
θψµδψαλ
θωψµωδψαλ
>
+−+−
−−−−+−−−
=
∗∗ mmss
x . 
To summarize in words, if the exchange rate and monetary base deviations from the target 
( ss −∗1 ) and ( mm ~1 −
∗ ) are sufficiently small (Case A1), the MOF does not intervene in the 
foreign exchange market at all. When intervention does take place, the amount rises with 
the size of the deviation. In Case A2, where the amount of intervention is smaller than 
ψω / , the BOJ does not sterilize the intervention at all. In Case A3, where the amount of 
intervention is larger than ψω / , the intervention is partially sterilized. 
Next, we consider Case B, where we have 0<ω . Substituting equations (1), (2) 
and (6) into equation (4), we obtain: 
 



−−>
−−≤
=
)1/( if)(
)1/( if)(
1
1
1 ψω
ψω
xxL
xxL
L II
III
, 
where: 221
2
11
2
111 )~()~()( xxmmsxxsxL
III θθµδαλ ++−+−−+= ∗∗ . 
Further differentiating with respect to x , we obtain: 
}])~)(({})([{2)( 121111
2
1
1 θδαλθδαλ −−−−+−= ∗ ssx
dx
xdLIII  
In this case, depending on how the actual exchange rate deviates from the target 
( ss −∗1 ), there are three separate cases to consider for the optimal value of x , as follows: 
Case B1:  If 0
)(
)~)((
2
2
1
12
1
11 <
+−
−−− ∗
θδαλ
θδαλ ss
, the optimal value of x  is 0=x . 
Case B2: If )1/(
)(
)~)((
0
2
2
1
12
1
11 ψω
θδαλ
θδαλ
−−<
+−
−−−
<
∗ ss
, the optimal value of x  is given by: 
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 ))1/(,0((
)(
)~)((
2
2
1
12
1
11 ψω
θδαλ
θδαλ
−−∈
+−
−−−
=
∗ ss
x . 
Case B3: If )1/(
)(
)~)((
2
2
1
12
1
11 ψω
θδαλ
θδαλ
−−>
+−
−−− ∗ ss






<
−− 0))1/((and 1
dx
dLII ψω , the 
optimal value of x  is given by:10
 
 
))1/((
)1()(
)~)(1()~)((
2
2
1
2
1
12
1
1111 ψω
θψµδψαλ
θωψµωδψαλ
−−>
+−+−
−−−−+−−−
=
∗∗ mmss
x . 
In words, if the deviation ss −∗1  is sufficiently small (Case B1), the MOF does not 
intervene in the foreign exchange market at all; when intervention does take place, the 
amount of intervention x  rises with the size of the deviation. In Case B2, where the amount 
of intervention is smaller than )1/( ψω −− , the BOJ fully sterilizes the intervention. Finally, 
in Case B3 where the amount of intervention is larger than )1/( ψω −− , the BOJ only 
partially sterilizes the intervention. 
II. ESTIMATING THE BANK OF JAPAN REACTION FUNCTION 
 
Empirical specification of the BOJ reaction function 
 
The Bank of Japan’s possible behavior with respect to sterilization is indicated by 
equations (5) and (6) of our political economy model, which specify its reaction under 
different sets of conditions to the size of intervention (as determined by the Ministry of 
Finance). Given the operational framework in place during the period of QEMP, the central 
bank reaction function derived from our political economy model would lead us to expect 
                                                 
10 If )1/(
)(
)~)((
2
2
1
12
1
11 ψω
θδαλ
θδαλ
−−>
+−
−−− ∗ ss
 and 0))1/((1 >−−
dx
dLII ψω
, the optimal value of x  is 
)1/( ψω −−=x . 
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that the BOJ was reluctant to fully accommodate the resulting reserve inflows associated 
with a large intervention, when it did not wish to allow the CAB target to be exceeded by a 
large margin. On the other hand, the model would have us believe that the central bank was 
more willing to accommodate the reserve inflows when the prevailing CAB level was well 
below the target. In specifying the empirical version of the central bank reaction function 
below, we will try to capture explicitly the size of each intervention relative to the existing 
or prospective deviation between the actual CAB and the target.  
Incorporating these ideas into equations (5) and (6), we specify the following 
empirical reaction function, which we will estimate by using daily data for the period of 
QEMP: 
dCABt = c1 +  β11 ITVt-2 +  β12 [D1 ITVt-2]+ β13 [D2 ITVt-2]+ ε1t  (7) 
where dCAB is a daily change in CAB, ITV is daily intervention (lagged two business days 
to reflect t+2 settlement); c1 is a constant; β11, β12 and β13 are parameters to be estimated; ε1 
is a random error term; and D1 and D2 are dummy variables that represent the size of 
intervention relative to the CAB target. Specifically, D1 takes the value of unity (zero 
otherwise) when CABt-1 is below the target (at t-1) and ITVt-2 is larger than the deviation 
(at t-1), such that the target is exceeded at settlement if fully accommodated; D2 takes the 
value of unity (zero otherwise) when CABt-1 is below the target (at t-1) and ITVt-2 is 
smaller than the deviation (at t-1), such that the target is not exceeded at settlement even if 
fully accommodated. 
The specification of equation (7) incorporates the implications of the theoretical 
model that, even if the CAB is below the target, the central bank may not fully 
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accommodate a (typically) large intervention that, if fully accommodated, will cause the 
target to be exceeded. Thus, we hypothesize that β11+ β12 <1. On the other hand, the central 
bank is more likely to fully accommodate a (typically) small intervention that will not cause 
the target to be exceeded even when fully accommodated. In this case, we hypothesize that 
β11+ β13 =1. If CABt-1 already exceeds the target, both dummy variables take the value of 
zero, so that we have: 
dCABt = c1 +  β11 ITVt-2 +  ε1t      (7’) 
If the central bank fully sterilizes the intervention, we have β11=0; otherwise, 0<β11<1. 
In terms of the theoretical model, these empirical specifications correspond to the 
assumptions that 02 =λ  (the BOJ does not have a target for the exchange rate) and 01 =σ  
(the cost of sterilization only has a quadratic term), which together imply 0~2 >−
∗ mm  in 
Case A and 0~2 <−
∗ mm  in Case B. That is to say, these restrictions mean that the BOJ only 
considers the deviation of the monetary base from the target when making sterilization 
decisions.11
mm ~/ 2 −=
∗ψω
 In Case A, the critical value of the reaction function then becomes 
. This means that, when ψω />x , CABt-1 is below the target (at t-1) and 
ITVt-2 is larger than the deviation (at t-1), corresponding to D1=1. Equation (5) then means 
β11+ β12 <1. When ψω /<x , CABt-1 is below the target (at t-1) and ITVt-2 is smaller than 
the deviation (at t-1), corresponding to D2=1. Equation (5) in this case means β11+ β13 =1. 
In Case B, on the other hand, CABt-1 exceeds the target (at t-1), corresponding to D1=D2=0. 
Thus, equation (6) in this case means β11=0 if )1/( ψω −−<x  or 0<β11<1 if )1/( ψω −−>x .  
                                                 
11 This is not an unreasonable assumption because the central bank was likely more concerned about macro-
prudential risks than the explicit level of the exchange rate. 
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Equation (7) was estimated by using the average realized CAB balance as the target 
CAB when the BOJ’s announced target implied a range, rather than a single value (see the 
next section for details). The daily data come from the 3-year period covering 19 March 
2001 to 16 March 2004 and include 130 days of intervention; they exclude six intervention 
days when the Japanese market was closed because the BOJ did not engage in domestic 
market operations on those days. The empirical results broadly support the implications of 
the political economy model, namely, the BOJ allowed the monetary base to rise in 
response to intervention only when there was a shortfall in meeting the CAB target (Table 
1). When there was no shortfall, intervention was fully sterilized, such that the coefficient 
of intervention in such cases (β11) was statistically insignificant. On the other hand, the 
coefficients of the slope dummies (representing the size of intervention) were both 
statistically significant. Moreover, the degree of accommodation was larger when the size 
of intervention was smaller than the CAB shortfall, compared to a situation where the size 
of intervention was larger than the deviation, such that β12 < β13. In fact, the hypothesis of 
β13=1 cannot be rejected (with a t-statistic of 0.0124), suggesting that the BOJ fully 
accommodated an intervention whose size was smaller than the deviation. 
Incorporating non-linear behavior 
The linear model of equation (7) explains the Bank of Japan’s daily reaction to 
intervention remarkably well, but it may fail to uncover an important non-linearity in 
central bank behavior (which may be reflected in the low R-squared). For example, the BOJ 
may have become progressively more determined to accommodate intervention when a 
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CAB deviation was larger. With such non-linearity, it is possible that the degree of 
accommodation was not constant but intensified as the deviation increased in size.  
 In fact, such possibility can be shown in our theoretical model by comparing the 
reaction functions for different deviations of the monetary base from the target. For 
example, consider the following five deviations of the monetary base from the target: 
=−∗ mm ~2
1M , 2M , 3M , 4M , and 5M  ( 54321 MMMMM >>>> ). Then, the 
corresponding reaction functions can be depicted as five upward sloping lines, all but one 
of which are kinked (Figure 4). Three cases can be considered separately, as follows. 
First, the only straight line ( =−∗ mm ~2
3M ) represents the case of 0=ω  
(i.e., 212122
3 /})~({ µσδλ −−−= ∗ ssM ), in which the reaction function is given by 
xxz ψ=Ψ= )(  for 0>∀x . Second, the two lower kinked lines ( =−∗ mm ~2
1M  and 
=−∗ mm ~2
2M ) are examples of Case A ( 0>ω ); the critical value of the reaction function 
ψω /  is larger in the case of 1M  than in the case of 2M . Third, the upper kinked lines 
( =−∗ mm ~2
4M  and =−∗ mm ~2
5M ) are examples of Case B ( 0<ω ); the critical value of the 
reaction function )1/( ψω −−  is smaller in the case of 4M  than in the case of 5M . It is 
clear from these lines that, given the same amount of intervention x , the size of 
sterilization z  falls as the deviation becomes larger (as long as sterilization is partial). In 
other words, the degree of accommodation ((x-z)/x) rises with the monetary base (or CAB) 
deviates more from the target. 
Equation (8) below attempts to capture this type of potential non-linearity in the 
central bank’s reaction function: 
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dCABt = c21 +   Φt  [c22 + β2 ITVt-2] + ε2t     (8) 
where c21 and c22 are constants, β2 is a parameter to be estimated, and ε2 is a random error 
term; Φ is a variable that reflects the deviation of the actual CAB from the target (CAB*), 
defined as: 
Φt = [1 + exp {–η2 (DEVt-1 – c23)}]-1      (9) 
where DEVt-1 = CAB*t-1 – CABt-1;  η2 is a parameter to be estimated; and c23 is a constant.12
 The results from estimating equation (8) are reported in Table 2. All the coefficients 
are found to be statistically significant, except for the constant c21. More meaningful is the 
proportion of accommodation or non-sterilization (Φtβ2), which is depicted in Figure 5. It is 
evident that, as the deviation increases from a negative range to a positive range, the 
proportion rises progressively from zero. As the deviation increases further, the proportion 
approaches unity and goes beyond. We conclude that the BOJ increasingly accommodated 
the reserve inflows from intervention when the actual CAB was farther below the target. 
 
Note that Φ is defined to lie between zero and unity, i.e., Φ approaches zero [unity] as the 
CAB deviation approaches negative [positive] infinity as long as η2 is positive. In equation 
(8), Φtβ2 indicates the proportion of accommodation—the extent to which the central bank 
is willing to allow the CAB to move in the direction of intervention. 
 
III. DID INTERVENTION SYSTEMATICALLY CHANGE MONETARY POLICY? 
Intervention and monetary base expansion 
 
                                                 
12 The constant c23 is included to depress the value of Φ (toward zero) in the negative range of the CAB 
deviation. This specification is motivated by the results from estimating the linear model, where we found that 
the BOJ almost fully sterilized intervention when the deviation was negative. 
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We have observed that the Bank of Japan sterilized or accommodated the impact of 
intervention on the monetary base according to how much the CAB balance was above or 
below the target. This is consistent with the prediction of our political economy model of 
central bank behavior. This means that, given the CAB target, the BOJ used intervention as 
an instrument of monetary policy. As long as the target was the BOJ’s own choice, the 
central bank’s operational independence appeared preserved. But the MOF could have 
affected the CAB balance though massive interventions, either by influencing the BOJ’s 
choice of the target or by raising the costs of sterilization. If so, monetary policy was no 
longer independent of intervention. The critical political economy question then concerns 
the potential endogeneity of the central bank target and the costs of sterilization with 
respect to intervention. 
In order to consider this question, we first combine the behavior of the BOJ and that 
of the MOF (equations (1), (5) and (6) in the theoretical model) to obtain the following 
expressions for a change in the monetary base ( mm ~− ) due to the MOF's intervention: 
Case A : 



>
≤
+−
=−
ψω
ψω
ωψ / if
/ if
)1(
~
x
x
x
x
mm     (10) 
Case B : 



−−>
−−≤
+−
=−
)1/( if
)1/( if
)1(
0~
ψω
ψω
ωψ x
x
x
mm     (11) 
As previously, Case A ( 0>ω ) represents a situation in which the initial deviation of the 
monetary base from the BOJ's target is sufficiently large, while Case B ( 0<ω ) describes a 
situation in which the initial deviation of the monetary base from the BOJ's target is 
sufficiently small. 
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Equation (10) states that, in Case A, the change in the monetary base necessarily 
becomes larger as the amount of intervention ( x ) becomes larger. On the other hand, 
equation (11) shows that, in Case B, intervention does not change the monetary base if its 
amount is below the critical level )1/( ψω −− ; if the amount is above the critical level, 
intervention can still increase the monetary base in this case because the BOJ finds the 
costs of sterilization too high. Understanding of the monetary impact of intervention can be 
facilitated by depicting these equations as diagrams, where x (the amount of intervention) is 
drawn on the horizontal axis and mm ~− (an increase in the base money) on the vertical axis; 
these are drawn separately for 0>ω (Figure 6) and 0<ω (Figure 7).  Analogous to Figure 
4, the relationship between a change in base money due to intervention ( mm ~− ) and a 
deviation of the monetary base from the central bank target ( mm ~2 −
∗ ) can also be shown 
diagrammatically (Figure 8). The figure essentially shows how intervention alters the 
monetary base as the central bank target changes. Given the size of x  and the initial 
balance of base money, as the target increases, as expected, there tends to be a larger 
increase in the monetary base. 
The monetary impact of an increase in the costs of sterilization ( Σ ), modeled here 
as a quadratic function 221)( zzz σσ +=Σ  ( 01 >σ , 02 >σ ), can likewise be analyzed 
diagrammatically both for 0>ω (Figure 9) and for 0<ω (Figure 10). As the costs are 
assumed to involve two components, each of these figures depicts the monetary impact of 
an increase in the costs separately for the linear term (case (i)) and for the quadratic term 
(case (ii)). In all four cases, as the costs of sterilization increase, a given amount of 
intervention will have a larger effect on the monetary base (it is only a mathematical 
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artifact that an increase in the linear cost term would lead to an upward, parallel shift in the 
monetary impact line, whereas an increase in the quadratic cost term causes both an upward 
shift and a steeper slope). We have therefore established that sufficiently large and 
persistent interventions by the government could alter the monetary policy decisions of the 
central bank by raising the monetary base target, the political costs of sterilization, or both. 
Institutional framework of intervention 
Some understanding of the institutional frameworks of intervention and quantitative 
easing in place during 2001-04 is essential before assessing whether the Ministry of 
Finance was able to alter the behavior of the Bank of Japan through its massive 
interventions. In Japan, the MOF intervenes in the foreign exchange market by using a 
special account of the National Budget called the Foreign Exchange Fund Special Account, 
and through the BOJ acting as its agent. When purchasing (selling) dollars, the MOF issues 
(redeems) financing bills (FBs), which are short-term government notes. Once issued, FBs 
are rolled over continuously as long as the underlying foreign assets are maintained as 
foreign exchange reserves. Sale of the underlying foreign assets, however, reduces the 
outstanding balance of FBs to the extent that the government redeems them. Because FBs 
are sold to (or purchased from) the public at market rates, some have interpreted this 
institutional arrangement to mean that intervention is automatically sterilized by design (Ito 
2005; Fatum and Hutchison 2005), a position also reiterated by the Bank of Japan on the 
impact of intervention on the monetary base (see Maeda et al. 2005). 
This must be qualified in four respects, however, in order to understand the 
mechanics of BOJ operations in response to intervention. First, when FBs are issued for 
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intervention purposes, they are entirely purchased by the BOJ. Because FB auctions are 
held weekly, there is no other practical way of conducting foreign exchange market 
intervention in a flexible and timely manner. Second, although FBs are sold to the market 
during a weekly auction, given the large and continuous rollover needs, the MOF usually 
does not repurchase the BOJ-held FBs all at once.13 Watanabe and Yabu (2007) suggest 
that about two months of time elapses between the intervention-induced purchase of FBs by 
the BOJ and the public sale of FBs by the MOF executed to unwind the position at the BOJ. 
Moreover, nothing would prevent the BOJ from holding the FBs longer or even purchasing 
the FBs from the secondary market, as indicated by sharp increases in the BOJ’s holding of 
FBs in the first half of 2002, and again in 2003 (Figure 6). Third, outright purchases of 
JGBs and other market instruments are another means of unsterilizing foreign exchange 
market intervention,14
Fourth, the BOJ could provide short-term liquidity to the government under 
exceptional circumstances. As a recent example, on 26 December 2003, the MOF reached 
agreement with the BOJ to sell US Treasury bills (TBs) held as foreign exchange reserves. 
This agreement came about in a circumstance where the massive dollar-purchasing 
intervention of 2003 had caused the balance of FBs to reach the statutory limit set by the 
National Diet. Specifically, the agreement noted that this was a time-bound measure 
whereby the BOJ would be prepared to purchase TBs from the Foreign Exchange Fund 
 notwithstanding the public sales of FBs by the MOF. 
                                                 
13 According to an official of the MOF’s Financial Bureau, as a general practice, up to 300 billion yen of new 
FB issues could be accommodated in each auction. This means that if there is a yen-selling intervention of 
900 billion, it would take a minimum of three subsequent weekly auctions to unwind the position at the BOJ. 
14 The Bank of Japan purchased (in net terms) long-term JGBs worth more than 18 trillion yen, bills worth 34 
trillion yen, and equities held by commercial banks worth 3 trillion yen during the period of QEMP. In July 
2003, it also began to purchase commercial paper against collateral. 
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Special Account up to 10 trillion yen until the end of March 2004; it also specified that the 
BOJ would resell the TBs back to the Foreign Exchange Fund Special Account within three 
months from purchase. Essentially, the intervention financed by the sale of TBs (with a 
repurchase agreement) during the first three months of 2004 was unsterilized by definition. 
In the event, the maximum balance of 6.15 trillion yen of short-term liquidity was provided 
to the MOF under this scheme, which was all unwound during June 2004 (see Figure 11). 
Interpreting the BOJ’s balance sheet expansion 
Over the period of QEMP, there was a rapid growth in base money (roughly 
consisting of current account balances and central bank notes) of over 43 trillion yen, which 
was almost exactly matched by a cumulative sale of 42 trillion yen by the Ministry of 
Finance in the foreign exchange market. The foreign exchange market intervention during 
QEMP can therefore be said to have been entirely unsterilized in terms of its economic 
impact, even though a large portion of the FBs initially absorbed by the Bank of Japan may 
have been subsequently sold to the public. The growth of base money was accompanied by 
periodic increases in the CAB target. Given the endogeneity of the public’s demand for 
central bank notes, the BOJ used the more controllable CAB as an intermediate target of 
monetary policy. Between March 2001 and January 2004, the BOJ raised the target in 
several steps, from about 5 trillion yen to 30–35 trillion yen, which would remain in effect 
through the end of QEMP in March 2006 (Table 3). 
At the same time, during the period of QEMP, the BOJ publicly announced the 
amount of monthly JGB purchases, which it raised, in several steps, from 400 billion yen 
initially to 1.2 trillion yen in October 2002 (see Table 3). As a result, the balance of long-
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term JGBs in the BOJ’s portfolio steadily rose from around 46 trillion yen initially to over 
65 trillion yen in March 2004 (Figure 12). An inspection of the BOJ balance sheet indicates 
that about a half of the increase in base money from March 2001 to March 2004 was made 
possible by the open market purchases of long-term JGBs, with the other half coming from 
the purchases of other assets (not shown in the figure). The outright purchases of long-term 
JGBs were subject to the self-imposed rule (introduced when QEMP began) that the 
balance should be kept below the outstanding balance of central bank notes issued (Maeda 
et al. 2005). During the period of the great intervention, this rule may have acted as a 
constraint on the amount by which intervention was allowed to increase the balance of base 
money. 
The critical question for our purpose concerns the motives behind the decision of 
the BOJ to raise the CAB target periodically over the course of QEMP. Are we to interpret 
the BOJ balance sheet expansion as a response to accommodate the monetary impact of 
large and sustained foreign exchange market interventions by the MOF? If so, the MOF 
was successful in using intervention to alter the BOJ’s behavior toward the balance of base 
money, hence the central bank’s otherwise independent monetary policy. Alternatively, 
should we think of the periodic increases in the CAB target as an autonomous monetary 
policy decision of the BOJ? Oda and Ueda (2007) show that market participants perceived 
the successive upward CAB revisions as a signal of greater commitment to monetary 
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accommodation; the announcement and successive upward revisions of the CAB target 
were used as a type of signaling device.15
To be sure, the BOJ was under intense political pressure. In the early 2000s, public 
dissatisfaction with the BOJ was so strong that politicians were openly proposing to revise 
the Bank of Japan Law (Umeda 2011). Yoshikawa (2009), who was an academic member 
of the Prime Minister’s Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy during 2001-2005, reviews 
the internal debate between the government and the Bank of Japan on the causes of 
deflation. The government took the view that monetary policy was the cause of deflation 
while the BOJ repeatedly argued that deflation was an outcome of economic stagnation. In 
the 15 February 2002 meeting of the Council, the Minister of Economy and Industry called 
for additional monetary easing, to which the BOJ Governor responded by saying that the 
monetary easing already in place was more than sufficient and that there was little the 
central bank could do to increase the money supply as long as the economy remained 
stagnant. 
  
Given the tense political background, the costs of undoing every effort of the 
government to inject liquidity through intervention must have been enormous. Watanabe 
and Yabu (2007), making a distinction between intervention and other government 
payments,16
                                                 
15 Jung et al. (2005) show in a theoretical model that the optimal monetary policy, when the central bank is 
faced with a weak economy and the zero interest rate bound, is to make a credible commitment to maintain 
zero interest rates even after the natural rate of interest returns to a positive level, as this would lead to higher 
expected inflation, lower long-term interest rates, and a weaker domestic currency. 
 used a dynamic regression model to show that, during the period of the great 
16 The current account balances of commercial banks increase, not only when the government intervenes in 
the foreign exchange market to purchase dollars for yen, but also when it makes pension and other payments 
to the private sector (conversely, the CABs decline when the government collects taxes from the private 
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intervention, the BOJ (i) accommodated more of the impact of intervention on the CAB 
(nearly 55 percent on average) and (ii) allowed the impact to remain longer (up to nine 
business days), compared with the impact of other government payments (40 percent and 
up to two business days, respectively). The fact that the CAB target was raised four times 
during the great intervention, from 17-22 trillion yen to 30-35 trillion yen (where the target 
would remain until the end of QEMP), is too coincidental to dismiss the possibility that, 
yielding to political pressure, the BOJ created additional room for unsterilized intervention. 
At least, this is how those on the government side seemed to perceive the situation 
(Mizoguchi 2004). 
 Remarkable, however, is the complete absence in the Policy Board minutes of any 
reference to foreign exchange market intervention.17
                                                                                                                                                    
sector). As is expected, the size of these government payments and receipts far exceeds that of foreign 
exchange market operations. 
 Equally remarkable, not a single 
reference to foreign exchange market intervention appears in a book-length analysis of 
Japanese monetary policy during 1998-2005 by Ueda (2005), who was a Policy Board 
member during that time. It is possible that, given the operational independence of the Bank 
of Japan, the central bankers conscientiously avoided any appearance of their decisions 
being influenced by government actions by keeping complete silence about intervention; it 
is unimaginable that they would have admitted yielding to political pressure even if they 
had in fact done so. 
17 The minutes of a monetary policy meeting of the Policy Board are released to the public, in the Japanese 
original and English translation, a month after the meeting (available at www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/). These are 
not the full transcript. According to the BOJ’s transparency policy, the full transcripts are released to the 
public only after 10 years. This means that we must wait until 2013 and 2014 to know if any reference was 
made by any member of the Board to foreign exchange market intervention as a basis for a monetary policy 
decision during the great intervention. 
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But a detailed analysis of each of the nine decisions to raise the CAB target under 
QEMP reveals that Board members often disagreed with the proposed decision, leading to a 
split vote in six of the nine cases. The Policy Board articulated in each case why an increase 
in the CAB target was warranted on the basis of its technical assessment of the prevailing 
economic and financial conditions; only in one case (20 May 2003) was there a passing 
reference to exchange rate volatility (but not foreign exchange market intervention) as part 
of the background against which the Board took the decision (Umeda 2011). Compelled in 
a press conference to explain the relationship between foreign exchange market 
intervention and the just announced decision to raise the CAB target, on 10 October 2003, 
BOJ Governor Toshihiko Fukui stated that the BOJ’s decision to supply liquidity was based 
on its assessment of overall economic conditions, and categorically denied any notion that 
it had been done to effect unsterilized intervention (as quoted in Umeda 2011, p. 151). 
In order to test formally the hypothesis that MOF intervention did not change BOJ 
behavior, we use the following ordered probit model: 
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where tPBD  refers to a discrete variable that represents the CAB target at time t, as 
determined by one of the ten BOJ Policy Board decisions to raise the CAB target (see Table 
3), such that tPBD   takes the value of 0 for the CAB balance following the first decision, 
the value of 1 following the third decision, and so forth; ∗tPBD  is an unobservable 
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continuous variable that corresponds to tPBD ; tCMI  is the value of cumulative 
interventions up to time t; γi (i=1,9) is a threshold value of ∗PBD  that triggers a BOJ 
decision to raise the CAB target to the next level; c3 and β3 are parameters to be estimated; 
and ε3 is an error term. The maximum likelihood estimates of the parameter β3, along with 
the threshold parameters, reject the hypothesis that the Bank of Japan systematically raised 
the CAB target in response to the value of cumulative interventions (Table 4). While the 
model fits the data fairly well (with a pseudo R-squared of 0.8), the estimated value of 
β3, though positive, is not statistically significant (with the p-value of 0.253). Likewise, 
Granger causality tests (not formally reported here) have rejected the hypothesis that MOF 
interventions caused the actual CAB balance or the CAB target.  
Part of the lack of strong quantitative evidence supporting causality from MOF 
interventions to BOJ decisions to raise the CAB target comes from the fact that the Bank of 
Japan took several decisions to raise the CAB target aggressively during the first half of the 
period while a greater part of the interventions took place toward the end of the period 
(Figure 13).  But it is still possible that the Bank of Japan raised the CAB target in 
anticipation of future MOF interventions, in which case MOF interventions did influence 
monetary policy. At least, the Bank of Japan created room for unsterilized interventions by 
the Ministry of Finance. Iwata (2010), Deputy Governor of the Bank of Japan from March 
2003 to March 2008, while stressing the near equivalence between the amount of 
intervention and the change in base money as a coincidence, endorsed the MOF-BOJ 
interaction as equivalent to central bank purchases of foreign bonds when the acquisition of 
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foreign assets by the government was consolidated with the acquisition of JGBs by the 
central bank. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This paper has considered the political economy of foreign exchange market 
intervention in a country, such as Japan and the United States, where two separate entities 
are responsible for intervention and monetary policy decisions. Noting the large scale of 
intervention conducted under the framework of quantitative easing during 2001-04, we 
used the case of Japan to motivate a theoretical model of the interaction between the 
Ministry of Finance (responsible for intervention) and the Bank of Japan (responsible for 
monetary policy). Estimation of the central bank reaction function derived from the model 
confirmed the theoretical prediction, namely, the BOJ determined the degree of sterilization 
on the basis of the size of intervention relative to the deviation of the current account 
balances (CAB) from the target. In particular, the BOJ accommodated a greater portion of 
the intervention when the actual CAB was farther below the target, while it fully sterilized 
when the target was already reached. There was also non-linearity in central bank response 
in that non-sterilization became progressively more intense as the CAB deviation was 
larger. 
An important implication of the political economy model is that the Ministry of 
Finance can alter central bank behavior with respect to the monetary base if the central 
bank target or the political costs of sterilization become endogenous to the size and 
persistence of intervention. Our assessment of whether the MOF changed the monetary 
policy of the central bank by injecting liquidity through massive foreign exchange market 
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intervention depends on how we interpret the successive increases in the CAB target made 
by the BOJ. Over the period of QEMP, the rapid growth in base money was almost exactly 
matched by the amount of cumulative interventions by the Ministry of Finance. While this 
is too coincidental to dismiss the possibility that, yielding to political pressure, the BOJ 
created additional room for unsterilized intervention, the official minutes of the BOJ Policy 
Board meetings are silent about foreign exchange market intervention as a factor in its 
monetary policy decisions. Nor do formal econometric tests give quantitative evidence 
supporting causality from intervention to monetary policy. 
Whether the MOF did or did not in practice change BOJ behavior during 2001-04 is 
of secondary importance, from the point of view of how society should design an 
institutional arrangement for exchange rate and monetary policies. The critical point is that, 
in a system where the government is in charge of intervention decisions while the central 
bank is given operational independence to pursue its own monetary policy objectives, there 
is potential room for government interference with the independence of the central bank 
when the political costs of sterilization become large. A conflict could arise if the 
objectives, or the judgment of prevailing economic and financial conditions, differed 
between the government and the central bank. On the other hand, if the two agencies share 
the same objectives and judgment, a case can be made for eliminating the duplication by 
transferring the intervention authority of the government to the central bank, as is already 
the case in many countries. Then, exchange rate policy can be made consistent with, and 
subordinated to, monetary policy, with the exchange rate used as an instrument of 
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achieving price stability (if not to maintain a certain exchange rate level).18
Under normal conditions it makes little sense for the government to intervene in the 
foreign exchange market against the judgment of the central bank. Unless interest rates are 
at the zero lower bound or interest is paid on excess reserves, the central bank is obliged to 
undo the monetary impact of any intervention operation by the government. Without the 
support of the central bank, therefore, intervention would have no monetary policy effect 
on the exchange rate. Moreover, unless the direction of intervention is the same as the 
expected future stance of monetary policy, no signaling effect could be expected in any 
case. There is even a possibility that foreign exchange market intervention sends a wrong 
signal about monetary policy. It is for this reason that Shirakawa (2008) argues that the 
authority to make intervention decisions should be given to the central bank; or at least the 
government should be required to consult with the central bank before intervening in the 
foreign exchange market. This appears to be the case in the United States, where there is 
said to be a “mutual veto system” between the Treasury and the Federal Reserve and, 
 This type of 
arrangement makes sense in some small open economies, such as Singapore, where the 
exchange rate is a more direct instrument of influencing the price level than a market 
interest rate (Parrado 2004); likewise, central banks under inflation targeting should be 
given authority to intervene in the foreign exchange market if the domestic price level is 
significantly determined by the exchange rate (Gersl and Holub 2006; Kamil 2008). 
                                                 
18 The central bank cannot pursue price and exchange rate stability at the same time unless it resorts to capital 
controls. 
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according to an informal agreement reached in the late 1970s both agencies usually provide 
roughly equal amounts of funds when official intervention does take place (FRB 2005).19
But what could society do when its independent central bank began to abuse its 
power by making a series of wrong decisions? Does it have to sit still until the term of the 
incumbent governor (or all of its Board members) ends? Or should there be an additional 
channel of checks and balances? Endowing the government with the authority to intervene 
in the foreign exchange market could play such a role of enhancing the democratic 
accountability of an independent central bank. In Japan, the Ministry of Finance at least 
came close to using (if not actually used) this authority to expand the balance of base 
money when it thought the policy stance of the Bank of Japan was insufficiently easy. The 
benefits are not entirely one-sided. This arrangement, by giving the intervention authority 
to the government, protects the central bank from political pressure to intervene especially 
in a country with a powerful trade lobby. It helps preserve the credibility of monetary 
policy under normal conditions when the central bank has no intention to change the stance 
of monetary policy and intervention is therefore of little efficacy as a tool of exchange rate 
policy. 
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Table 1. Bank of Japan’s Daily Reaction Function under QEMP: 
A Linear Model 
 
     
     Variable Coefficient Standard error t-statistic Probability 
     
     Constant 199.2551 273.8592 0.727582 0.467101 
ITV (β11) -0.05952 0.212983 -0.27944 0.779982 
D1 ITV (β 12) 0.732272 0.314194 2.330641 0.020042 
D2 ITV (β 13) 1.045596 0.36893 2.83413 0.004721 
     
     Adjusted R-squared 0.019983 Durbin-Watson statistic 1.98939 
     
     Notes:  D1 and D2 take the value of unity 16 and 43 times, respectively, with all other interventions taking 
place when CAB was above the target; the number of observations is 739. 
 
 
Table 2. Bank of Japan’s Daily Reaction Function under QEMP: 
A Non-Linear Model 
 
     
     Variable Coefficient Standard error t-statistic Probability 
     
     ITV (β2) 1.535974 0.491813 3.123087 0.0019 
DEV (η2) 0.000128 5.73E-05 2.239735 0.0254 
Constant (c21) -2957.079 1975.101 -1.497179 0.1348 
Constant (c22) 8987.236 3167.889 2.836979 0.0047 
Constant (c23) 7644.518 3691.805 2.070672 0.0387 
     
     Adjusted R-squared 0.080123 Durbin-Watson statistic 1.872804 
     
     Notes: standard errors and covariance are estimated by White heteroskedasticity-consistent estimators because, 
unlike the linear case, heteroskedasticity cannot be rejected; a Ramsey RESET test was used to reject the 
hypothesis of linearity (with an F-statistic of 12.891 and the p-value of 0); the restriction β2=1cannot be 
rejected by a Wald test with a chi-square statistic of 1.18765 and the p-value of 0.2758. 
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Table 3. Monetary Policy Decisions under Quantitative Easing, 
 March 2001-January 2004 
Policy Board meeting where 
the decision was made 
Targeted current account 
balances (CAB) 
Monthly purchases of Japanese 
government bonds (JGBs) 
19 March 2001 About 5 trillion yen 400 billion yen 
14 August 2001 About 6 trillion yen 600 billion yen 
18 September 2001 Over 6 trillion yen -- 
19 December 2001 About 10-15 trillion yen 800 billion yen 
28 February 2002 -- 1 trillion yen 
30 October 2002 About 15-20 trillion yen 1.2 trillion yen 
25 March 2003 About 17-22 trillion yen 1/ -- 
30 April 2003 About 22-27 trillion yen -- 
20 May 2003 About 27-30 trillion yen -- 
10 October 2003 About 27-32 trillion yen -- 
20 January 2004 About 30-35 trillion yen -- 
1/ Effective 1 April 2003. This was explained as a technical adjustment necessitated by the conversion of the 
Postal Services Agency (in charge of postal savings) into Japan Post Public Corporation as part of a long-term 
privatization plan. 
Source: Bank of Japan. 
 
 
Table 4. Ordered Probit Model of Bank of Japan Decisions: 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Probability 
β3 0.004828 0.004226 1.142332 0.2533 
Threshold parameters 
γ1 0.808073 0.125846 6.421141 0.0000 
γ2 2.523451 0.405992 6.215518 0.0000 
γ3 154.6156 135.6994 1.139398 0.2545 
γ4 349.1948 305.4462 1.143228 0.2529 
γ5 459.1957 402.3471 1.141292 0.2537 
γ6 460.5573 402.3474 1.144676 0.2523 
γ7 569.8181 498.8199 1.142332 0.2533 
γ8 1090.956 955.1157 1.142223 0.2534 
γ9 1592.681 3.29E+11 4.84E-09 1.0000 
Pseudo R-squared 0.800380 Observations 739 
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Source: Ministry of Finance. 
 
 
Figure 2.  The Central Bank Reaction Function ( 0>ω ) 
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Figure 3.  The Central Bank Reaction Function ( 0<ω ) 
 
 
Figure 4 
Monetary Base Deviations and Corresponding Central Bank Reaction Functions 
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Figure 5. Bank of Japan Response to Daily Intervention, 
 March 2001-March 2004 
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Notes: Zero non-sterilization (on the vertical axis) means that intervention is fully sterilized; a positive 
CAB deviation (on the horizontal axis) indicates that the CAB falls short of the target. 
 
 
Figure 6. 
The Monetary Impact of Intervention ( 0>ω ) 
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Figure 7. 
The Monetary Impact of Intervention ( 0<ω ) 
 
 
Figure 8. 
The Monetary Impact of Intervention When the Target Changes 
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Figure 9. 
The Monetary Impact of Intervention When the Costs of Sterilization Change ( 0>ω ) 
 
(i) The case of  an increase in 1σ  
 
 
(ii) The case of an increase in 2σ  
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Figure 10.  
The Monetary Impact of Intervention When the Costs of Sterilization Change ( 0<ω ) 
 
(i) The case of an increase in 1σ  
 
 
(ii) The case  of an increase in 2σ  
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Source: Bank of Japan. 
 
Source: Bank of Japan 
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Figure 13. Cumulative Interventions (CMI) and Discrete CAB Target Increases (PBD) 
 
 
 
 
